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COLLECTIVE REDRESS: BROADENING EU ENFORCEMENT 
THROUGH STATE LIABILITY?  
 
James Marson* and Katy Ferris**  
 
 
ABSTRACT. This article advances an argument that private enforcement of 
European Union (EU) rights has largely been stunted due to a series of blocking 
tactics by Member States, enabled through a form of tacitic subservience of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. Currently, State Liability is neither an 
effective system of redress under tortious liability, nor a genuine enforcement 
mechanism in domestic law. By enabling collective redress in State Liability, we 
present an argument, missing explicitly in current literature, that both as a viable 
remedy through the (UK’s modified) tort of breach of statutory duty, and through 
granting effective redress through action by the EU Commission, State Liability will 
become the mechanism for corrective justice the Court of Justice envisaged in 1991. 
In 2011, the EU Commission issued a non-binding Recommendation establishing 
collective redress for breach of competition law. Could this be seen as positive 
positioning by the EU to seize the initiative for greater access to individuals of justice 
and justiciable solutions?  
 
Keywords: State liability, collective redress, enforcement mechanisms, statutory 
duty, EU Commission, damages. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this article is to critique the remedy of State Liability for individuals 
suffering loss as a result of a Member States’ non-implementation or incorrect 
transposition of EU law. ‘Enforcement mechanisms’ is a topic which has been 
considered through a vast literature and from varying perspectives. Even a novice to 
the subject will be aware that as a consequence of membership of the EU, 
obligations have been imposed on individuals (and not confined to the signatory 
Member State) to follow laws derived from the EU. A corollary to this has been to 
ensure individuals have the full access to protective rights established at an EU 
level. Typically, the EU creates a directive (the most common source of EU 
legislation) which establishes harmonisation of the law through the 28 Member 
States. Directives are an oft used legislative instrument as they do not impose the 
rigidity and uniformity of EU Regulations, and whilst binding as to the result to be 
achieved, they grant to Member States discretion as to the choice of form and 
methods through which to give effect to (or, in the parlance, to transpose) the law.1 
The intention has always been that in using directives as a legislative source, the EU 
articulates the main aims and objectives of the necessary law, it provides the 
Member States a period of time within which to transpose the law into their legal 
systems, and thereafter, individuals access the law through the domestic transposing 
provision. Where access to the EU law in this manner is not possible (due to, for 
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 Article 288 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
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example, the Member State’s non-implementation or incorrect transposition of the 
law), the EU Commission has the authority to compel a Member State’s compliance. 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provides for 
enforcement through, first, a (pre-litigation) notification and secondly, a judicial 
procedure,2 - the Commission fulfilling the role of ‘guardian of the treaties.’ The 
Commission has a substantial role of ensuring Member States conform to obligations 
and it possesses unlimited discretion3 as to which cases are brought before the 
Court of Justice. Beyond investigations undertaken under its volition, other Member 
States,4 individuals and organisations are also empowered to complain to the 
Commission regarding alleged infringements. The Commission has the power to fine 
Member States for late transposition of directives through a special penalty regime.5 
However, despite this power, late transposition notices are not uncommon – for 
instance they have previously been applied against more than two-thirds of Member 
States,6 and even against 237 Member States in a further example.  
 Where the notification procedure of ensuring compliance fails, the 
Commission may launch infringement proceedings at the Court of Justice. In 2012, 
there were 1343 infringement cases open,8 and although this number has fallen 
consistently since 2009,9 and the explicit intentions of the Commission produce 
demonstrable improvements in the levels of Member State compliance,10 there 
remain complaints from both academics11 and the EU Parliament12 regarding the 
                                            
2
 Articles 258-260 TFEU. 
3
 The discretionary investigatory power is sometimes negatively viewed as enabling selective 
enforcement. See Richard Rawlings, Engaged Elites Citizen Action and Institutional Attitudes in 
Commission Enforcement, 6 European Law Journal 4, 10 (2000). 
4
 Available in Article 259 TFEU, although, given the political ramifications for undertaking such an 
action, its use (and success) has been very limited (the following cases are where this mechanism 
has been used - Case 141/78 France v United Kingdom [1979] E.C.R. 2923; Case C-388/95 Belgium 
v Spain [2000] E.C.R. I-3123; Case C-145/05 Spain v United Kingdom [2006] E.C.R. I-7917; Case C-
364/10 Hungary v Slovakia). 
5
 Article 260(3) TFEU. 
6
 Regarding Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 amending Directives 98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 
2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the 
European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority 
(European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority 
(European Securities and Markets Authority) (L 331/120). 
7
 In respect of Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 
2010 amending several Directives in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority 
(European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and 
Markets Authority).  
8
 Of these, 1062 were closed following compliance by the Member State, but 128 cases were still 
open as it could not be confirmed that the Member State had complied with the judgment of the Court 
of Justice. 
9
 http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/docs/docs_infringements/annual_report_30/com_2013_726_en.pdf. p. 8 
10
 See Robert Thompson, Opposition Through the Back Door in the Transposition of EU Directives, 
11 European Union Politics, 577, 592 (2010) ‘The… states’… deviat[ion] is effectively reduced to zero 
when the Commission explicitly supports a Directive’s provision. Such support signals the 
Commission’s intention to monitor compliance stringently in Member States that express incentives to 
deviate.’ 
11
 Melanie Smith, Enforcement, Monitoring, Verification, Outsourcing: The Decline and Decline of the 
Infringement Process, 14 European Law Review 777 (2008) and Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, 
Accountability and Law Enforcement: The Centralised EU Infringement Procedure, 12 European Law 
Review 447 (2006). 
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efficacy and transparency of the system of infringement proceedings. Enforcement 
actions by the Commission remain an important13 and significant aspect of effective 
governance,14 yet all too frequently, it has been reported that this system is not fit for 
purpose,15 does not provide accessible justice for those individuals affected, does 
not deter Member States sufficiently from flagrant breaches of EU law, and has been 
restricted in its success16 due to the expanding membership and competence of the 
EU. It is clear, even by the admission of the Commission itself, that EU law is 
frequently not being implemented and enforced in a satisfactory manner.17 
 The focus of enforcement by the Commission is to ensure Member States 
fulfil their obligations, and whilst a breach often results in individuals being denied 
access to rights conferred by the EU, the sanctions imposed on the recalcitrant State 
do not take into account the effects of such a breach or associated losses incurred 
by individuals. No private remedy is provided through enforcement at an EU level. 
This is the remit of the domestic level of enforcement. 
 Beginning with the direct effect of treaty articles (and later directives), affected 
individuals who were denied access to EU rights due to, for example, the non-
transposition of a directive, could argue that the national court had to give effect to 
the directive directly in that court. This was a remedy only available against a State 
body or (latterly) an emanation of the State, and hence could not be used between 
private parties (such as an employee with a claim against an employer unless it 
involved an ‘advance effect’ or ‘negative effect’ of directives through a Mangold18-
type application). Due to this constraint in the law, the Court of Justice developed the 
remedy of indirect effect and its requirement of a purposive method of statutory 
interpretation19 (but which was of very limited use in the case of non-transposition of 
the directive and where no domestic law, capable of a purposive interpretation, 
existed). Finally, through Francovich20 and the establishment of the State’s non-
contractual liability for losses, the Court created a system of compensatory redress 
for individuals to be provided through the national law, and enforceable through the 
                                                                                                                                       
12
 The lack of transparency in proceedings was raised by the European Parliament in ‘Report on the 
25th Annual Report from the Commission on Monitoring the Application of Community Law (2007)’ 
A6-0245/2009, para 13. 
13
 See Jonas Tallberg, Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union, 56 
International Organization 609 (2002). 
14
 And an increasingly important aspect of respect for the rule of law and the Commission’s interests 
in strengthening its enforcement in this area – see European Commission ‘Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A New EU Framework to Strengthen the 
Rule of Law’ Brussels, 11.3.2014 COM(2014) 158 final. 
15
 See Christian B. Jensen, Implementing Europe: A Question of Oversight, 8 European Union Politics 
451, 453 (2007). 
16
 See Tobias Lock Is Private Enforcement of EU Law Through State Liability a Myth? An Assessment 
20 Years After Francovich, 49 Common Market Law Review 1675 (2012). 
17
 Communication from the Commission on Implementing European Community Environmental Law, 
COM/2008/0773 final – http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008DC0773:EN:NOT  
18
 Case C-144/04 Werner Mangold v R̈diger Helm [2005] E.C.R. I-10013. 
19
 Although see Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside – An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stanford Law 
Review 725 (2014) for an analysis and critique of the theories underpinning the textualist and 
purposivist approaches to statutory interpretation. The authors conclude that an alternative paradigm 
is required, adopting a pragmatic approach to interpretation. 
20
 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci and others v Italy [1991] E.C.R. I-5357. 
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domestic courts, which, whilst being a damages action for losses, is frequently 
referred to in the body of law known as ‘enforcement mechanisms’.21 
 Enforcement mechanisms has been a subject of importance since the 
inception of the Community, as a lack of enforcement (and a failure to secure access 
to rights) may be considered democratised theft.22 Member States that do not 
adhere to EU obligations, particularly in relation to social policy and employment 
rights, may gain a political, economic, and financial benefit. Losses sustained by 
individuals for such transgressions may, financially at least, be relatively small 
although the impact on their lives and the relationship they have with (for example) 
their employer and the State is substantial. Member States that do adhere to EU 
obligations will incur costs either directly or through the competitiveness of the 
organisations that operate within the Member State, and a competitive disadvantage 
is evidently the consequence. The history of the Court of Justice’s case law on this 
subject has been to ensure compliance amongst Member States, thereby creating 
fairness to all the individuals who work within the remit of that State’s authority, and 
ensuring that Member States do not obtain an advantage from their breach of EU 
law. The time has come for the full effects of Francovich to be realised23 and for a 
substantial mechanism to be established which compels adherence to the law. 
 
II. THE DEBILITATING EFFECT OF COSTS 
 
A Member State’s breach of EU law does not affect an individual in isolation, but 
rather there are multiple affected individuals all suffering an inability to avail 
themselves of (often) protective rights which are designed with the aim of, for 
                                            
21
 For a discussion of the EU utilizing rights, enforceable by individuals, to establish policy without the 
associated costs, see R. Daniel Kelemen, Suing for Europe: Adversarial Legalism and European 
Governance, Comparative Political Studies 39, 101 (2006).  
22
 See David Vogel, The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consumer and 
Environmental Regulation in Europe, 33 British Journal of Political Science 557 (2003). 
23
 In the UK, for example, in the first 20 years of the availability of redress through State Liability, a 
mere 22 cases were heard before English courts - R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex 
p. Gallagher [1996] 2 CMLR. 951; Bowden v South West Water Services Ltd [1998] 3 CMLR. 330; R v 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food ex p. Lay and Gage [1998] COD 387; Boyd Line 
Management Services Ltd v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (No.1)  [1999] Eu. L.R. 44; R 
v Department of Social Security Ex p. Scullion [1999] 3 CMLR. 798; R v Secretary of State for 
Transport ex p. Factortame Ltd (No.5) [2000] 1 AC 524; Evans v Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] EWCA Civ 32; R v Secretary of State for Transport 
ex p. Factortame Ltd (No.6) [2001] 1 WLR 942; Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No.3) [2003] 2 
AC 1; Phonographic Performance Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [2004] EWHC 1795 (Ch); 
Sayers v Cambridgeshire CC [2006] EWHC 2029 (QB); Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly 
Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2007] UKHL 34; Byrne v Motor Insurers' 
Bureau [2008] EWCA Civ 574; Moore v Secretary of State for Work and Transport [2008] EWCA Civ 
750; Spencer v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2008] EWCA Civ 750; FJ Chalke Ltd v 
Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2009] EWHC 952 (Ch); Cooper v Attorney General [2010] 
EWCA Civ 464; R (on the application of MK (Iran)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2010] EWCA Civ 115; Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners [2010] EWCA Civ 103; R (on the application of Negassi) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2011] EWHC 386 (Admin); Test Claimants in Thin Cap Group Litigation v 
Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2011] EWCA Civ 127; Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Ltd v 
Corporate Officer of the House of Commons 67 Con. L.R. 1. Of these, in 12 cases was the claimant 
an individual, and in total, 9 of the 22 cases were successful in obtaining a remedy. The more recent 
case of Delaney v Secretary of State [2014] EWHC 1785 (QB) and the judgment regarding the 
element of discretion (or lack thereof) for the State and its subsequent liability gives hope for future 
cases. 
 5 
example, the betterment of their working lives. However, the existing system of 
liability redress is for each individual to claim against the State to obtain damages.24 
Issues of costs,25 procedural difficulties,26 quantum of damages, and the cost/benefit 
of the resources required to obtain redress through litigation compared with the 
monetary gains awarded, present problems to the current system which has resulted 
in its limited effectiveness in the 24 years since the Francovich ruling.  
In realising the effects of the Francovich judgment, consideration of how a system 
of collective redress can help to remove a substantial barrier to the functionality of 
the enforcement of EU law and also help to deter non- and incorrect transposition of 
directives is paramount. The premise of this argument is from the Commission’s 
recent non-binding Recommendation regarding collective redress for alleged 
breaches of EU antitrust / competition law. As part of the Commission’s consultation 
process prior to enactment of the Recommendation, the European Coalition for 
Corporate Justice27 commented:  
 
Compensatory collective redress should have to cover all sectors where the 
mass damage due to the breaches of EU law is possible and not be limited to the 
areas of consumer law or competition. This would allow for example cases of loss 
of personal data or breaches of data protection, negligent financial advice to 
financial service users, environmental damage or breaches of employment rights 
to be tackled via collective claims.28 
 
Parallels may be drawn between the Commission's non-binding Recommendation 
regarding collective redress for instances of anti-competitive behaviour by bodies 
within Member States, and an extension of the principle to State Liability. Here the 
Commission is primarily granting rights to individuals to access justice where, in 
many cases at least, it would be financially unviable to pursue such action through 
the courts. The expense of litigation, coupled with the very low remedy awarded 
under quantum, restricts the ability of individuals in such a situation to obtain 
redress. Similarly, social policy directives establishing protections from discrimination 
                                            
24
 The reality is that most do not enforce their rights. Specifically in relation to tortious liability, 
research presented by Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing 
the Adversary Culture, 15 Law & Society Review 525, 544–45 (1981) demonstrated that, in the US, 
merely 3.8% of those individuals with a tort grievance actually enforce their rights in court. That figure 
could be even lower in the UK. 
25
 See, for way as an example of the Danish Consumer Ombudsman scheme – ‘Report Paves the 
Way for Class Action Lawsuits on Behalf of Danish Consumers’ http://www.forbrug.dk. Also, a system 
whereby claimants engaged in the same Member State, experiencing the same legal issue and, often, 
experiencing the same level of financial loss would be likely to benefit from a more efficient use of 
legal resources and would result in ‘judicial economy’ for the legal system in a reduction in the 
numbers of individual claims necessary to achieve the same result. In the UK, costs associated with 
access to courts and justice were proportioned accordingly - Court Fees: 3-5%;  Bailiffs’ Fees: 3-5 %; 
Lawyers’ Fees: 70-90%;  Experts’ Fees: 5-10%; Witness Compensation: 2-5%; and 
Translation/Interpretation Fees: 5-7% (Jean Albert “Study on the Transparency of Costs of Civil 
Justice Proceedings in the European Union” (EC Commission, DG for Justice, Freedom and Security 
2007), 9). 
26
 Hans-W, Micklitz & Astrid Stadler, The Development of Collective Legal Actions in Europe, 
Especially in German Civil Procedure, 17 European Business Law Review 1481 (2006). 
27
 ‘Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress.’ Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/dgs_consultations/ca/replies_collective_redress_consultatio
n_en.htm. 
28
 ibid. Answer to Q33 in the Commission consultation document. 
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experienced on the basis of (for example) sexual orientation,29 beliefs and non-
beliefs,30 because the individual works under a fixed term contract31 or is a part-time 
worker,32 have been incorporated into domestic law on the basis of a parent EU 
Directive. Further, fundamental protections on the requirements to preserve the 
rights and conditions of work attributed to employees following the transfer of a 
business from one owner to the next,33 and requirements to consult with employees 
and/or their representatives in the event of redundancies and/or transfers of an 
undertaking34 are also subject to a parent EU law. In the instances identified above, 
the UK has been found (or an argument has been presented alleging it to be) in 
breach of its obligations, with the result that individuals have been denied protection 
to which they were entitled. The level of compensation available often makes it 
uneconomic to bring an individual claim, but the worker wishes to assert his or her 
rights or gain protection which is currently unavailable through domestic law. Direct 
effect is unavailable in cases where the individual is employed in the private sector 
(due to the horizontal / vertical distinction and application of directives), and indirect 
effect is a possible, albeit opaque remedy, where there exists domestic legislation 
capable of interpretation (although this is by no means a given state of affairs and 
frequently falls to the reference procedure35 and consequent delay in accessing a 
remedy). State Liability is therefore not merely (or indeed nor should it be seen 
principally as) a mechanism to provide compensation for breach. Rather, we argue, 
its significance is in enabling an individual to force a Member State to take remedial 
action36 and comply with EU law in order, albeit indirectly, to access a right which 
has been denied him or her and to act as the watchdog the Court of Justice had 
envisaged when developing the suite of enforcement mechanisms. 
 
III. STATE LIABILITY AND THE AWARD OF DAMAGES 
                                            
29
 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, Art 1, and transposed in the UK through the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and the Equality Act 2010. 
30
 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, Art 1. 
31
 Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term 
work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP OJ L 175/43, and transposed in the UK through The 
Fixed-term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002. 
32
 Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the Framework Agreement on part-
time work concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC OJ L 14 and transposed in the UK through The 
Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000. 
33
 Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of businesses, OJ L 061, and Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on 
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights 
in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses, OJ L 82.  
34
 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies, and transposed in the UK through The Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, amended by the Collective Redundancies and Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 1995 and The Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981, amended by the Collective 
Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 
1995 and 1999. 
35
 Article 267 TFEU. 
36
 Although others have already discussed the concept of extending Francovich-type damages 
actions beyond the mere award of monetary compensation – see in particular Michael Dougan, The 
Francovich Right to Reparation: Reshaping the Contours of Community Remedial Competence, 6(1) 
European Public Law 103 (2000). 
 7 
 
A little over twenty years ago, the Court of Justice famously held:37 
 
… the effectiveness of [EU] rules would be impaired and the protection of the 
rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain 
compensation when their rights are infringed by a breach of law for which a 
Member State can be held responsible.38 
 
The ruling provided for the effectiveness of EU law to be reaffirmed,39 and a new 
(hybrid) form of liability in public law40 (despite the fact that many disputes arising 
from the breach of EU law affect private parties), to be established and made 
enforceable before national courts. English law did not provide a neat form41 of 
tortious liability into which the principles established through State Liability would fit. 
It did not align neatly with the rules to establish misfeasance in public office (as the 
test of bad faith and deliberate42 abuse of power is more onerous than the tests for 
State Liability), nor negligence, as liability here is usually linked with fault43 leading to 
some form of injury or harm connected with the award of damages. Liability for pure 
economic loss is particularly difficult to establish and from which to gain redress, and 
whilst State Liability provides damages for economic losses incurred by the claimant, 
it does not give the claimant direct access to the EU rights conferred through the 
law,44 nor does it require the claimant to link the damages claimed with actual proof 
of harm. State Liability in the UK adopts a bastardised45 form of breach of statutory 
duty,46 albeit with fundamental distinctions. Whereas the basis of a State Liability 
action is to recover damages from the State (by its nature a public body and 
therefore involving a public tort),47 the tort of breach of statutory duty avoids the 
imposition of liability and “distinguishes clearly between private and public law 
                                            
37
 The Court of Justice, had, in Case 6/60 Humblet v Belgium [1960] E.C.R. 559, 569 established the 
duty on Member States to make good damage incurred due to national laws conflicting with EU law. 
38
 Fn 20 at [33].  
39
 Despite arguments as to its success (see e.g. Roberto Caranta, Judicial Protection Against Member 
States: A New Jus Commune Takes Shape, 32 Common Market Law Review 703, 725 (1995); 
Fernand Schockweiler, La responsabilité de l’autorité nationale en cas de violation du droit 
communautaire, 28 Revue trimestrielle de droit européen 27, 42 (1992), it is arguable that such 
effectiveness has never been realised. 
40
 Although a second set of legal proceedings outside of the normal ‘private’ sphere may ‘hardly be 
compatible with the requirement of an effective legal remedy’ Case C-316/93 Vaneetveld v SA Le 
Foyer [1994] E.C.R. I-763, at [775], per Jacobs AG. 
41
 In Application des Gaz SA v Falks Veritas Ltd [1974] 1 Ch 381, Lord Denning had suggested (obiter 
[395-6]) the creation of a new form of tort law to provide an effective remedy for such breaches. 
42
 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No.3) [2000] UKHL 33; [2003] 2 AC 1.  
43
 The requirement of a finding of fault was rejected by the Court of Justice in Brasserie du Pêcheur v 
Germany [1996] at [56].  
44
 It does grant such access indirectly as the Member State, having been found in breach of its EU 
law obligations and ordered to compensate the affected claimant, will change / amend / ‘clarify’ the 
law to avoid any further claims (and exposure to damages actions). Hence, following the finding of 
State Liability, the State invariably grants access to individuals through remedial action. 
45
 See comments by Judge Toulmin QC, R v The Secretary of State for Transport ex parte 
Factortame Ltd. (No.7) [2000] EWHC (Tech) 179 at [176].  
46
 Breach of statutory duty was used by Lord Diplock in Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing 
Board [1984] AC 130 [141] when identifying potential liability for breach of Art. 86 EEC Treaty (now 
Art. 102 TFEU) as applicable to individuals who suffered loss. 
47
 X v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 AC 633.  
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actions such as judicial review.”48 Breach of statutory duty includes a remoteness 
element whereby the statute must include an objective requirement that the breach 
and damage suffered is actionable in private law, and thereby the statute intended 
for the conferment of a remedy for the claimant. Statutes often do not expressly 
identify such an intention and the courts are left in the position of ‘hunting’ for 
intention, incorporating presumptions and weightings, through textual and purposive 
examination. This led to the creation49 of a State Liability remedy model based on 
non-contractual / tortious liability.50 For English law, a new hybrid fusion of English 
and EU law was created and to be applied by the domestic courts.  
 Despite Francovich and the resultant necessity for the domestic judicial 
activism and creation leading to a suitable tortious liability remedy, Member States 
continued to be required to fulfil their obligations for the correct and timely 
implementation of directives. Failure in this regard may lead to the award of 
damages as the Member State was obliged to make good any loss / damage51 
sustained by the claimant, and justified on the principles of equivalence52 and 
effectiveness.53  
 Victims of infringement / transgression of EU law thus have routes by which to 
claim damages where they have suffered loss or harm. This was established in 
relation to competition law generally in Courage and Crehan54 and Manfredi,55 
having already been established in Francovich in relation to State Liability. Beyond 
the general principles of law which allow redress as identified in these cases, 
however, various practical limitations apply to affect the reality of the ability for the 
individual victims to successfully recover damages. In the UK, for example, the 
prospect of an individual personally funding a public law action or, without retaining 
legal representation, presenting such a case is a practical impossibility. Trades 
unions and some public bodies do fund State Liability claims, but these are relatively 
rare and, in 2012, in the UK, only 2.6 million workers were union members engaged 
in the private sector. Such private sector workers lack the protection of availing 
themselves of a (vertical) direct effect claim against their employer, they may face 
the problems of enforcing the law through indirect effect, and whilst these workers 
may have the financial and legal support of their union to pursue a remedy of State 
Liability, clearly the overwhelming majority of workers in both public and private 
                                            
48
 Paula Giliker, English Tort Law and the Challenge of Francovich Liability: 20 Years On, 128 The 
Law Quarterly Review 541, 546 (2012). 
49
 A national system establishing and facilitating the award of a remedy was required, however, given 
the unique nature of the effects of Francovich, and its adoption by Member States to be lukewarm at 
best, by 1997, no Member State had introduced any legislative measures to give effect to this 
development in EU law (SOU ‘Det Allmannas Skadestandsansvar vid Overtradelse av EG-regler’ 
1997, 194). 
50
 Although not every breach / infringement of EU law by a Member State constitutes a tort - Borgouin 
S. A. and Others v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1986] QB 716. 
51
 Francovich Fn 20 at [36].  
52
 In relation to anti-trust / competition law, the principle requires Member States to sanction breaches 
of the EU law in the same way, and thereby equivalent to, the application of domestic law. 
53
 A national court must not make it impossible of excessively difficult for a party to exercise his or her 
EU rights – see Francovich [1991] Fn 2 at [33] and [39]. Further, In Autologic Holdings Plc v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [2004] EWCA Civ 690 [2004] 2 All ER 957 Gibson LJ stated: ‘The 
importance of the principle of effectiveness in Community law cannot be overstated. Any provision of 
national law which makes the exercise of a right conferred by Community law practically impossible or 
extremely difficult cannot prevail.’ 25. 
54
 Case 453-99 Courage Ltd. v Crehan [2001] E.C.R. I-6297. 
55
 Joined Cases C-295-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA [2006] E.C.R. 
I-6619. 
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sectors are not trade union members. Further, 27% of permanent employees were 
trade union members compared with 15% of temporary employees.56 The statistics 
demonstrate greater vulnerability for workers who are not in trades unions and who 
are less likely to possess the funds to bring their own, individual action for State 
Liability. 
 
IV. CLASS ACTIONS / COLLECTIVE REDRESS 
 
There exists a catalogue of complexity and barriers which an individual must 
overcome to avail him/herself of, first, compensation through State Liability and 
secondly, a means of enforcing EU rights. Beyond the domestic procedural rules 
regarding tortious liability of a public body, one of the most debilitating factors of any 
public law action is the financial cost involved. This has been recognised at an EU 
level, and the response of the Commission has seen it institute mechanisms, first by 
encouraging Member States through its non-binding Recommendation to establish a 
system of collective redress, and secondly (albeit a separate measure) by 
compelling them through a (proposed) directive relating to compensation, connected 
to breaches of EU anti-competition laws.57 This has initially been established on the 
basis of, and restricted to, anti-trust / competition law, but the principle of enabling 
collective redress to access/enforce EU rights is a compelling move.58 The EU 
evidently recognised a major barrier to justiciable problems and action needed to be 
taken at an EU level to ensure individuals can access justice, along with the broader 
positive effects that derive therefrom. 
 It is important to recognise from the outset that incentivising private 
individuals59 to enforce their rights and to act as a watchdog in assisting the 
Commission in its role as guardian of the treaties has not simply been the exclusive 
want or remit of the EU. Increasingly, Member States60 in the EU have been 
establishing systems whereby individuals are in a position, through private claims, to 
seek damages on the basis of corporate wrongdoing and malfeasance61 (although 
this does not mean that such systems are particularly widespread or have universal 
agreement).62 The positive positioning of some Member States has been mirrored by 
                                            
56
 Department of Business Innovation & Skills (2012) ‘Trade Union Membership 2012 Statistical 
Bulletin May 2013, p. 6. 
57
 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing 
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union.  COM(2013) 404, 11.6.2013. 
58
 For a comparative study of the effectiveness of collective redress in competition law see Clifford A. 
Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA (Oxford University Press 1999). 
59
 See Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding 
Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
2119, 2144-6 (2000) where ‘By the 1960s, lawyers, judges, academics and legislators began to 
conceive of civil justice as having characteristics readily associated with criminal justice and 
administrative systems:.. Creating incentives for entrepreneurial private actors to use the civil justice 
system to partake in the work of public norm enforcement offered an alternative to centralizing power 
exclusively within the government.’ 
60
 France, for example, has recently established a system of collective redress into its Consumer 
Code – albeit restricted to State authorised consumer associations. 
61
 Hans-W. Micklitz & Astrid Stadler, The Development of Collective Legal Actions in Europe, 
Especially in German Civil Procedure, 17 European Business Law Review 1473 (2006). 
62
 For example, the German (conservative / social democrat) coalition government elected in 2013 
have opposite views on the issue of collective redress in competition laws, with the negative position 
being such a development would be unnecessary, be subject to abuse and require substantial 
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the EU, albeit the extent of, and the best mechanism by which to facilitate, such 
access has been in consideration for some time. Approximately 19 Member States 
including the UK have existing, or are proposing, collective redress mechanisms, 
using opt-in and opt-out models, which in many ways follow the collective redress 
procedures in the US. The existing use of collective redress has largely been limited 
to consumer rights, securities litigation and anti-competition law violations. This 
sectoral approach is instructive in that any further expansion of collective redress 
would need to adopt a similar pattern. Employment protection / social policy appears 
to be an area of EU competence that would benefit from the application of a system 
of collective redress. 
 
A. COLLECTIVE REDRESS - TO OPT-IN OR OPT-OUT? 
 
Under a system of collective redress, two mechanisms are available as viable 
options. The first is a system whereby the affected individual has to make an 
informed decision to pursue an action against the defendant and be part of the 
‘class’ of litigants in a particular case. This is the ‘opt-in’ procedure which ensures 
that a definable, genuine group of affected individuals who have been impacted by 
the breach and have sustained some form of monetary loss can be identified, and 
associated remedies through compensation can be distributed. Individuals declare 
that they intend to participate in the legal action which assists the court in 
establishing with certainty a group of claimants. As this group exists in advance, 
distribution of any award is easier, as is the calculation of risk by the defendant of the 
potential damages,63 and it aligns itself with the legal systems of many Member 
States. The opt-in system is often championed as enabling a legal freedom not 
offered through opt-out. With opt-in, each individual has the option to form part of the 
collective group seeking redress, whilst enabling those who wish to pursue an 
individual claim to proceed without any restraints. However, as demonstrated in case 
studies presented in 2007, the BEUC (the European Consumers’ Bureau) found: 
 
the freedom not to have one’s claim is often overstated in opt-in regimes. 
Commencing proceedings without the explicit consent of those affected is not 
necessarily a limitation on the claimant's freedom of choice, since people are 
able to withdraw from the group and pursue individual actions or decline to 
litigate altogether.64  
 
Further, the opt-in system has been criticised as not removing the problem of 
potential-claimant inertia65 and where lawyers are not motivated (presumably 
                                                                                                                                       
amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure; and the UK coalition government has stated its misgivings 
regarding the extent of the reach to establishing a system of collective redress. 
63
 Many defendants value collective redress due to the finality of the action with no fear of subsequent 
claims from affected individuals or a requirement to maintain a damages fund beyond the life of the 
collective claim and appeals – see Francis E. McGovern, Distribution of Funds in Class Actions––
Claims Administration, 35 Journal of Corporation Law 123 (2009). 
64
 BEUC (2007) Private Group Actions - Taking Europe Forward. BEUC Reflections on a Future 
European Collective Redress Scheme for Individual Damage Claims p. 15. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/dgs_consultations/ca/replies_collective_redress_consultatio
n_en.htm. 
65
 See Albert A. Foer & Jonathan W. Cuneo, Toward an Effective System of Private Enforcement in 
Albert A. Foer & Jonathan W. Cuneo (eds) The International Handbook on Private Enforcement of 
Competition Law 605 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010). 
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financially rather than through other altruistic and value-based factors), litigation will 
simply be an ineffective means of accessing rights.66 As way of an example, the 
Enterprise Act 2002 s.19 inserted into the Competition Act 1998 a new section 
(s.47B) which provided for representative actions to be brought on behalf of 
consumers. Under this legislation, the Consumer Association, on behalf of a few 
hundred named individuals, brought proceedings against the retailer JJB Sports in a 
follow-on67 action by the Office for Fair Trading regarding price-fixing on the supply 
of replica football shirts. The defendant settled, but the proportion of consumers who 
joined the case compared to the number of consumers affected was very small, and 
the value of the claim, compared to the costs of pursuing it, led to the Consumer 
Association remarking that it would not bring a similar opt-in action again.68 
 The alternative mechanism available is where the affected individuals will 
automatically form part of the collective action unless they declare and thereby affirm 
that they wish to be excluded. This is the ‘opt-out’ procedure. Each mechanism has 
its benefits and drawbacks, and in the consultation process undertaken by the 
Commission, and the feedback provided, the majority of respondents identified that 
the opt-in mechanism was their preferred choice. The opt-out mechanism is widely 
considered to be the more aggressive form of collective redress and may not be 
particularly apt for situations of consumer protection / antitrust violations. Hence, the 
overwhelming response in this respect by the respondents to the Commission’s 
consultation exercise, and the resultant Recommendation, selected the ‘opt-in’ 
model. Of course, State Liability is a different proposition and given that individuals 
denied access to rights provided by the EU affects a clearly identifiable class (who 
by their nature share a commonality) – such as workers when the situation involves 
certain social policy laws – and the damages sustained will in many situations be 
similar / identical to all the members of that class, the opt-out model should be 
adopted (similar to that used in Denmark). It is ultimately more suitable for low value 
claims and where individuals are unlikely to be aware that their rights have been 
infringed or breached. This mechanism provides the most inclusive and appropriate 
approach to enable access to justice and promoting accountability, transparency and 
to incentivize compliance with EU obligations. Many citizens in the EU affected by 
the breach of the Member State are poorly placed to opt-in to a class action claim, 
they may have limited access to information, be socially isolated, or suffer health 
problems that can be exacerbated by the stress of individually pursuing a claim 
through the courts. Collective redress through a system of opt-out can reduce these 
problems. 
 
B. COLLECTIVE REDRESS – WHY NOT? 
 
Criticisms of a system of collective redress, despite the existence of advantages to 
both individuals and the Commission in ensuring access to EU rights and holding to 
                                            
66
 ibid at 607-8. 
67
 A follow-on action occurs where an infringement of competition law has been found by a 
competition authority (for example the European Commission and/or an industry-sector regulator). 
The claimant must, however, demonstrate how the claim relates to his/her own case. For further 
developments on this, and the boundaries for such claims, see Case C‑ 557/12 Kone AG and others 
v ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG 5th June 2014. 
68
 As reported in The Law Society response to the EU Commission consultation document Towards a 
Coherent European Approach to Collective Redress (2011), 9-10. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/dgs_consultations/ca/replies_collective_redress_consultatio
n_en.htm. 
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account those responsible for breaches, are numerous. The main criticisms to its 
adoption in the EU, and particularly articulated in relation to anti-competition laws – 
but in some instances could be applied to State Liability generally, include the 
following.  
 
(I) THE US MODEL WILL BE MIRRORED IN THE EU 
 
The US is frequently presented as embodying the worst effects of a litigation 
culture69 where lawyers provoke abusive claims70 (unlikely to be successful at trial) 
and are the only ‘beneficiaries’ of class actions.71 Lazy generalisations critiquing 
alternative methods of enforcement of rights are quite unhelpful when formulating a 
new paradigm of access to justice and it would be unwise to consider that claims that 
are unsuccessful or their outcome is uncertain are by their nature abusive. It is even 
more so when individuals affected by the current system are those often least able to 
protect themselves or to fund representation. It is without doubt that, in using the 
model of the US as a comparator, some cases will have been heard in the US courts 
which are without merit, which are abusive, and will be brought with the intent of a 
settlement to be reached to avoid the litigation costs/judgment and costs of 
discovery72 and award of damages or due to the exposure to risk through multiple 
claimants / treble damages awards and associated legal fees.73  
 However, in reality there are few if any meaningful, empirical bases on which 
these arguments have been sustained. It is possible that meritless claims might be 
initiated by the inexperienced (lawyer or claimants) or those who wish for a public 
‘day in court’. But this, along with abusive claims, can be effectively controlled 
through judicial examination of the case and subsequent management. Damages 
awards, in cases involving State Liability in the UK, based as they are on the hybrid 
tort of breach of statutory duty, are hence not subject to the award of punitive 
damages. The defendant in the case of State Liability actions will, naturally, be the 
State and therefore will not suffer the damage of adverse competition or cases being 
brought by a competitor seeking advantage through pursuing ‘nuisance’ claims. 
Fears that lawyers will merely take cases, which for individuals would be 
                                            
69
 See Deborah R. Hensler, Nicholas M. Pace, Bonnie Dombey-Moore, Elizabeth Giddens, Jennifer 
Gross & Erik Moller, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for Private Gains (RAND Institute 
for Civil Justice 2000) at 15-18, available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR969/index.html. 
70
 For example, in the US, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was established to ensure 
that claims presented in federal courts have merit  (are not frivolous) and are not brought for an 
improper purpose - although see Julia K. Cowles, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
the Duty to Withdraw a Baseless Pleading, 56 Fordham Law Review 697, 700 (1988) for a 
demonstration of the general lack of effectiveness of the Rule in deterring such claims and how US 
class action claims fails to lead to benefits to the claimants (consumers and citizens). 
71
 Whilst it is frequently noted that private individuals to class action claims rarely obtain a meaningful 
remedy whilst lawyers representing the group obtain very large payments for their services, see Brian 
T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and their Fee Awards, 7 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 811 (2010) and Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and 
Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 248, 262, 265 
(2010) which demonstrated that lawyers’ fees were 12% for cases where recovery of damages 
exceeded $175.5 million (and 23% for claims involving significant smaller awards). 
72
 Referred to ‘nuisance settlements theory’, see Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Neither Petitioners Nor Respondents at 10-11, Bell Atl. Corp. v Twombly, 550 US 
544 (2007) (No. 05-1126). 
73
 Referred to as ‘hydraulic pressure theory’, see Charles B. Casper, The Class Action Fairness Act’s 
Impact on Settlements, 20 Antitrust 26 (2005). 
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uneconomic to pursue, and will lead to an opening of the floodgates, have not 
materialised in jurisdictions where collective redress is available. Further, to prevent 
some form of unjust enrichment or unethical practice being pursued, the UK could 
adopt a ‘cy pres’ system where residual money from the award of damages can be 
used in specified mechanisms to assist in achieving the aims of the claim (i.e. the 
basis of the action), as opposed to being returned to the defendant or being retained 
by the lawyers. 
 The legal systems of the US compared with those within the EU are different 
and the procedural rules in which they operate are sufficiently distinct to prevent any 
potential for reflected negative consequences. Juries do not assess the quantum of 
damages, members of the judiciary are not elected, contingency fee arrangements 
limit the fees recoverable by lawyers and damages are based on losses incurred in 
prescribed areas. As such, concerns that the Member States in the EU will find their 
legal systems inundated with spurious and speculative claims appear unfounded. 
 The Commission recognised the potential problem of directly following the US 
model (or attracting unfavourable comparisons) and as such suggested use of an 
opt-in model in its Recommendation which necessitates a deliberate action to 
become a party to the class of litigants in the case. The UK’s Consumer Rights Act 
2015,74 however, despite the arguments presented above, enables collective redress 
in anti-competitive / anti-trust cases75 following a more ‘radical’ opt-out model.76 Not 
only does the UK appear to be leading the way in this regard, fears of developing a 
US-style litigation culture seem to be ill-founded. 
 
(II) THE AGGREGATION AND AMPLIFICATION EFFECT 
 
Opponents to the use of collective redress often point to the existence of the 
aggregation effect77 and the resultant possibility of abuse. Collective redress enables 
individuals who would otherwise be unable to seek access to their rights due to the 
limitations of high costs and low financial ‘rewards’ to challenge wrongdoing. 
However, it is argued, this aggregation (including possibly tens / hundreds of 
thousands of weak claims) may in effect change substantive rights due to 
defendants settling claims where the mere possibility of an adverse ruling could 
result in potentially significant compensation payments (regardless of the merits of 
the claim); and, it is argued from a consumer / antitrust perspective, that such 
aggregation may result in a disincentive for firms to operate businesses in a Member 
State where they could be exposed to collective redress claims and be subject to 
expensive litigation. This would be to the detriment of the citizens of the Member 
State who benefit from the legitimate activities of businesses but which may choose 
not to operate in the Member State due to this fear. 
 However, collective redress, despite the aggregation effect, does have the 
ability to persuade the defendant to seek the use of alternative forms of dispute 
resolution and/or the settlement of the claims prior to court action on the basis of the 
improved bargaining position achieved by the claimants. 
                                            
74
 Which gives effect to the provisions of the Recommendation regarding collective redress in relation 
to breach of anti-trust / competition laws. 
75
 See Schedule 8, Part 1. 
76
 A limited right for representative groups / trade associations to take action on behalf of consumers, 
on an opt-out basis, through an amended Competition Act 1998 (s.47B). 
77
 See Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation, Amplification and Distortion, University of 
Chicago Legal Forum, 475 (2003). 
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 Through the aggregation of claimants’ loss, individuals may have suffered 
greater or lesser loss but are still part of the same collective action. This is true in 
relation to anti-competitive laws, but the disparity in redress through damages 
becomes more apparent when considered in the wider context of EU law generally, 
and particularly in social policy laws where, for example, protective awards are made 
in relation to the lack of effective consultation prior to redundancies,78 potential 
breaches of an individual’s right to enforce a maximum working week,79 and, of 
much greater significance in this regard, an individual who may have suffered some 
form of discrimination at work.80 Where these breaches are effective due to inaction 
or incorrect transposition of EU law by a Member State, aggregating losses 
sustained through adherence to strict quantification criteria could prove to be 
problematic, and further, where there are potentially many thousands of individuals 
affected, the prospective claim for damages against the State could be so 
prohibitively expensive, that a court would not feel capable of imposing such a 
judgment. Indeed, potential losses sustained through the breach of EU law and 
where the Member State is considered liable under torts law, could dwarf any fine or 
imposition of sanctions available to the EU. A safeguard, which would by necessity 
have to be incorporated into any such enforcement mechanism, would be the 
discretion of the courts to reject legal actions or to limit the maximum compensation 
awarded. That of course leads to the unenviable situation whereby the greater the 
damage sustained by individuals and the more flagrant abuse by a recalcitrant 
Member State, the less likely that full damages would be available. 
Under the existing system of individual actions, such claims will, by necessity, 
be heard in different courts with the possible and likely result that different 
conclusions (judgments) will be drawn between the various court cases. This leads 
to a reduction in any (rolled-up) awards being made against the defendant. With 
collective redress, the individual claims are collated into a single action with the 
‘gamble’ for the defendant that an adverse ruling could have financially devastating 
results (the amplification effect). The UK Competition Law Association cite the US 
case Rhone-Poulenc where Judge Posner remarked on the situation where perhaps 
as few as 8% of the claimants in this class action would likely satisfy the tests to 
establish the liability of the defendant and there was ‘great likelihood that the 
plaintiffs’ claims… lack(ed) legal merit.’81 However, the US Supreme Court 
acknowledged the significance of class actions as a mechanism to facilitate 
claimants to pool resources, they are ‘peculiarly appropriate’ where the ‘issues 
involved are common to the class as a whole’82 and they enable an ‘opportunity to 
save the enormous transaction costs of piecemeal litigation.’83  
 
(III) DETERRENCE DOES NOT WORK 
 
                                            
78
 USDAW v Ethel Austin Ltd (In Administration) [2013] UKEAT/0547/12/KN, and USDAW and Wilson v 
Unite the Union, WW Realisation 1 Ltd and Secretary of State for Business, Innovation & Skills [2013] 
UKEAT/0548/12/KN. 
79
 Case C-484/04 Commission v United Kingdom [2006] IRLR 888. 
80
 Compare the approaches taken in Rowstock Ltd v Jessemey [2013] ICR 807 and Onu v Akwiwu & 
Anor [2013] ICR 1039 and the necessity of judicial acrobatics to comply with EU law. 
81
 UK Competition Law Association (2011) Response to European Commission’s Consultation on 
Collective Redress www.competitionlawassociation.com (ukmatters: 18238974.3) April, 2.3(b). 
82
 Califano v Yamasaki, 442 US 682, 701 (1979). 
83
 Ortiz v Fibreboard Corp., 527 US 815, 860 (1999). 
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One of the main arguments for collective redress being applied to cases of State 
Liability is the ability of individuals to access their rights, and to deter Member States 
from breaching their EU obligations. A cautionary note regarding the efficacy of the 
deterrence effect of collective redress can be seen when considered from the 
perspective of the developments in consumer protection and anti-trust actions. 
Hodges remarks that:  
 
most of the UK cases have involved industries that are already heavily 
regulated.84 There is no evidence in those cases that regulation was 
inappropriate or ineffective or that the corporations would have acted any 
differently at the relevant times. If that is so, the argument for indirect 
regulation by threat of litigation, as a complementary mechanism to direct 
regulation… looks weak, unnecessarily duplicative, and wasteful of resources. 
If litigation does produce change, it seems to be a very costly way of doing 
so.85   
 
This argument has been challenged in the US courts,86 but it is also true that 
deterrence may ‘remain far from optimal due to three remaining problems: the 
rational apathy on the side of individual victims (in particular, those who suffered trifle 
damage), problems to finance the claim and the risk of free-riding, which may equally 
reduce the number of claims brought below the efficient level.’87 Further, whilst 
industries may be regulated, transposition of directives remains the duty of the State 
and inaction or misapplication in this area negatively impacts on an individual who is 
dependent on an accessible legal system through which to seek redress. The distinct 
nature of State Liability in this respect negates the arguments relating to the 
ineffectiveness of deterrence in collective actions. 
 
C. COLLECTIVE REDRESS AND DETERRENCE 
 
A significant argument for the adoption of a form of collective redress against 
Member States, and not simply limited to cases of anti-trust / competition laws, is 
that Member States are charged with the responsibility of transposing correctly and 
on time EU laws in the form of directives. There are mechanisms in place to protect 
a Member State that innocently fails in the correct transposition, and the EU provides 
Member States with sufficient time in order to comply with the judicious transposition 
of the law. Given the safeguards, Member States that fail in their duty should be 
subject to sanctions and these have traditionally been through complaints 
                                            
84
 This is true, but it is also quite evident that public methods of fining companies for breaches of the 
law have, often, been largely ineffective in controlling bad behavior, have not led to a deterrence to 
many large companies, and there is certainly not an over-deterrence that some commentators have 
suggested could be the ultimate result of regulation through collective redress. See Centre for 
European Policy Studies et al., Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: Welfare 
Impact and Potential Scenarios, at 28, Contract DG Comp/2006/A3/012 final (Dec. 21, 2007). 
85
 Christopher Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach, Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law 321, 341 (2001). 
86
 To counteract the potential problems of the deterrence effect of collective redress, the US Supreme 
Court identified that ‘the purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies was 
not merely to provide private relief, but was to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust 
laws’ Zenith Radio Corp. v Hazeltine Research, Inc. 395 US 100, 130-31 (1969). 
87
 Centre for European Policy Studies et al., Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the 
EU: Welfare Impact and Potential Scenarios, at 28, Contract DG Comp/2006/A3/012 final (Dec. 21, 
2007), 301. 
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procedures initiated by or through the Commission. Member States will be aware 
that sanctions for breach of EU law have traditionally been limited, the Commission 
lacks in many cases the ability and resources to effectively monitor 28 Member 
States and the plethora of laws and legal areas in which the EU has competence, 
and enforcement by individuals through State Liability has been established since 
1991, but relatively few cases have been brought before the courts and even fewer 
have been successful.88 Indeed it is well remembered that Mr Francovich failed in his 
own seminal case of establishing State Liability.89 Given these few examples 
provided to illustrate the limitations of the effectiveness of State Liability as a means 
of ensuring compliance with EU law, is it any wonder that Member States may take a 
rational view that where compliance with EU law may be ideologically, politically or 
financially repugnant, the sanctions for breach (if and when such a breach is 
discovered and actioned) would not dissuade them from such activity? Collective 
redress enables a mechanism of cost-internalisation for the wrong-doer to exist 
which is necessary as currently, there is little in the way of practical deterrence90 that 
would compel a Member State to comply with its EU obligations against its will or 
judgement. This follows the optimal deterrence model established by Gary Becker 
who identified the cost that deterrence requires from both public and private 
resources, but such costs have to be addressed in relation to the seriousness of the 
breach and its effects on society.91 This is by the very nature of the model, the 
optimal aspect. 100% compliance with the law by a Member State is unlikely, if at all 
possible (or indeed desirable - it may prove to be inefficient to devote the necessary 
resources to provide compliance at this level).  What is required is enforcement that 
provides an equilibrium between the costs and benefits to the individuals, society, 
the Member States and the EU as a collective body. The consensus92 appears to be, 
however, that whilst deterrence is an important aspect of collective redress,93 this 
should not extend to the award of punitive damages.94 It has been remarked that 
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 See fn. 23. 
89
 Here, Francovich used a domestic industrial relations, rather than a more appropriate civil claims, 
procedure – although the Italian legal system appeared not to know which was the designated 
procedure to use in such a case. 
90
 Deterrence can be exhibited in many ways, including negative publicity and the effects on 
reputation, whilst also encompassing financial penalties which may have a broader effect on private 
organisations involved in wrongdoing. As a way of an example of the effectiveness of this second 
example of the deterrent effect of collective interests, Lande and Davis, citing results of an empirical 
research project involving 40 private anti-trust class-action claims in the US, found that the amounts 
recovered in damages by private individuals exceeded the aggregate amount of fines imposed by 
public bodies in the same period of time. Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits from Private 
Antitrust Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 University of San Francisco Law Review 879, 
906 (2008). 
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 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 Yale Law Journal 347 
(2003). 
92
 However – see Francis E. McGovern, Punitive Damages and Class Actions, 70 Louisiana Law 
Review 435, 462 (2010) for an opposite view ‘Whether called “economic,” “extra compensatory,” 
“exemplary,” or “punitive,” these global damages would result in tortious defendants being held 
responsible for all the harm they cause rather than only the subset of harm calculated from the 
damages won by opportunistic plaintiffs.’ 
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 It is seen as a mechanism not so concerned with the compensation of claimants’ losses but 
principally aimed at retribution and deterring wrongful / harmful conduct – Exxon Shipping Co. v 
Baker, 128 Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008). 
94
 Punitive damages should only be awarded in cases where the defendant’s actions have been so 
reprehensible as to warrant ‘advanced’ sanction and punishment - State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 427 (2003). 
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punitive damages is analogous with the fines imposed following conviction of a 
criminal offence.95 
 It is also feasible that without appropriate redress and sanctioning of the 
wrong-doer, the wrong-doing activities are continued and a state of underdeterrence 
is established. Examples of continued incorrect transposition of directives by the UK 
are numerous and the inability of redress through State Liability has perpetuated this 
state of affairs. McGovern96 provides an overview of this problem and demonstrates 
the various difficulties that belie the availability of State Liability in its use and effect: 
 
A problem of underdeterrence can arise in the context of mass tortious activity… 
From the perspective of society as a whole, if a defendant faces litigation from 
only ten to twenty percent of the plaintiffs who are tortiously harmed—a normal 
range of lawsuit filings—then that defendant will underinvest… because it is not 
fully benefitting from the avoidance of liability resulting from an optimal 
investment. If only twenty percent of injured plaintiffs sue, then the defendants 
will be responsible for only twenty percent of the damages and will, therefore, 
invest less… to correspond with the lower benefit of the avoided [incident].97 
 
There have been relatively few cases of State Liability actions in the UK since 1991, 
and even where cases have been successfully argued, awards of damages are 
applied to the individual claimant. If one takes social policy law as an example, EU 
social policy directives often affect many millions of workers in the UK, the UK 
government may not be particularly concerned over potential legal action for its 
breach of the law under the current structure of procedural limitations, court fees and 
requirement that each claimant brings his or her claim individually. Collective 
redress, particularly one adopting an opt-out model, may redress this imbalance by 
facilitating cases more readily through the courts and any subsequent award of 
damages against the defaulting State could be multiplied many thousands of times to 
the class of claimants to the action. Collective redress could prove to be a 
substantial weapon in defending individual workers’ rights. 
 
V. GIVING EFFECT TO COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN STATE LIABILITY 
 
To begin, a significant issue to overcome in adopting a system of collective redress 
in State Liability is of ensuring adherence to the principles of primacy and national 
procedural autonomy. EU law is supreme over inconsistent domestic law (EU law 
has primacy) although the application of EU law has been decentralised to the 
Member States. Individuals enjoy the right to claim compensation for breaches of EU 
law but the details of facilitating such claims are subject to national procedural law. 
The concern occurs where there is friction between the requirement to adhere to EU 
law and any existing national procedure which may prevent its effective application. 
In an attempt to avoid obvious tensions that may exist, the Court of Justice has 
conditioned the use of national procedural rules to comply with EU law on the basis 
of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Equivalence requires that national 
procedural rules governing a dispute with an EU law dimension may not be less 
favourable than those governing domestic disputes. As effectiveness necessitates 
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the right to effective judicial protection,98 individuals must have access to the 
application of EU law, and appropriate systems of judicial review and supervision. 
The principle of effectiveness has led to issues relating to access to courts and 
judicial proceedings,99 legal aid,100 national rules on standing,101 and the use of 
mandatory out-of-court dispute resolution procedures102 (to name but a few). It is 
clear that effectiveness enjoys a broad approach in interpretation by the Court of 
Justice, and this may extend to effective access where individual litigation may prove 
practically inaccessible. 
 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the current system of access to 
EU law and to domestic remedies exists. Primacy of EU law in this regard is not in 
question, it is the application of national rules, along with national procedural 
autonomy, that is being examined. There is no denying that an individual with 
sufficient resources, be that personal or through association with a supporting body, 
has the ability to seek damages against a Member State for breach of EU law. What 
has been presented so far is a brief overview of the potential problems that exist for 
individuals seeking access to courts and access to awards of damages. This is not 
the same as what has been termed a direct collision between EU law and national 
procedural rules. Rather, this exemplifies the indirect collision whereby national 
procedural rules can essentially hinder the effect of access to EU law. Primacy103 
does not provide an adequate solution as there is no incompatibility of national law 
which can be set aside to give greater access and effectiveness to the EU law 
sought. Therefore the argument being presented requires the assistance and 
cooperation of Member States to give greater effectiveness to EU law through 
national courts. This has been achieved through the Commission Recommendation 
in relation to collective redress for anti-competitive behaviour, and it is possible that 
Member States, in good faith, could realise the effectiveness of damages for 
individuals affected by the breach of EU law through its own action or inaction, and 
given the strict and literal approach to future transposition to be taken, as promised 
by the government, it would by necessity only be the most flagrant breaches of EU 
law which would satisfy the ‘sufficiently serious breach’ to establish the culpability of 
the State and the award of damages. 
 
If a system of collective redress can overcome a major barrier to the accessibility of 
State Liability, with its power to compel action on the part of Member States whilst 
deterring malpractice or intransigence, what form should it take? Three bodies that 
could take the necessary action are the Commission, the Member States 
themselves, or the Court of Justice. Using a legislative or case law approach, each 
would have benefits and drawbacks, and whilst it is beyond the scope of this article 
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to critique each in the depth necessary to do justice to such discussion,104 it is 
sufficient at this point to outline the most significant aspects. 
 The most likely form collective redress would take is through legislative action 
from the Commission (supported by subsequent judicial action through the Court of 
Justice and national courts). As has been seen, in respect of competition law and the 
protection of consumers, the Commission had identified problems in the availability 
of damages and enforcement generally:  
 
despite the requirement to establish an effective legal framework turning 
exercising the right to damages into a realistic possibility, and although there 
have recently been some signs of improvement in certain Member States, to date 
in practice victims of EC anti-trust infringements only rarely obtain reparation for 
the harm suffered.105  
 
The Commission called106 for Member States to introduce a system of injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in domestic law with a deadline of July 
26, 2015. Being a Recommendation, and requesting implementation, did not 
establish any compulsion on Member States to transpose this initiative into domestic 
law. However, the Commission stated that it would evaluate the status of collective 
redress laws in the Member States after a four-year period. Even at this stage, given 
the details provided by the Commission and the request for Member States to adopt 
this Recommendation, it is considered to be a mere intermediate step107 and that 
certainly within the four-year period, the Commission will be establishing a directive 
to ensure collective redress is part of the legal systems of Member States when 
protecting consumers generally and anti-trust / competition laws in particular. Many 
Member States already had collective redress mechanisms in place in their legal 
systems prior to the Recommendation and, unsurprisingly, there has been a quiet 
acceptance to the aims of the Commission in this regard. On 12 June 2013, following 
the Recommendation, the UK began consultation on its draft Consumer Rights Bill 
which, among others, sought to establish a system of enforcement of consumer and 
competition laws utilising, in part, collective redress (and collective settlement) as a 
vehicle for access to justice.  
 This form of collective redress was realised in England and Wales in 2015 
through the Consumer Rights Act. This is a very positive first step, and through 
utilising an opt-out model, it demonstrates a movement towards seeing the value of 
collective redress in combating wrong-doing, providing access to justice, and 
deterring actions which seek to provide a competitive advantage deriving from 
malfeasance or abuse. The government was not obliged to follow the 
Recommendation, and the fact that both the EU and the UK have voluntarily entered 
into the spirit of access to rights and access to justice through a mechanism of 
collective redress, albeit in relation to competition laws, must be viewed as a 
potential willingness to progress this to other areas. The opt-out model chosen by 
the UK in Schedule 8 of the Consumer Rights Act to transpose the 
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Recommendation, offers potentially greater benefits for individuals (and competitors) 
than may have been achieved through an opt-in model. Deterrence will likely be 
greater, as will facilitating the functioning of the internal market.  
 
A. ESTABLISHING THE RULES OF COLLECTIVE ACTIONS IN STATE LIABILITY 
 
Extending the argument for collective redress to State Liability will necessitate 
legislative action by the EU rather than relying on the Member States or indeed the 
Court of Justice to take up such an initiative. Member States would and have 
demonstrated differing approaches to such access, and whilst they may be willing to 
accede to the necessity for collective redress when preventing the worst examples of 
anti-competitive behavior, whether Member States would willingly establish a system 
which makes it easier for claims against them due to their own transgression of EU 
law is unlikely at best. A Regulation or directive would be required to compel 
adherence and ‘acceptance’ of a system of collective redress in this area.  
 Further, collective redress would likely be subject to limitations and 
restrictions on the bodies empowered to bring such claims; be subject to strict 
deadlines;108 rules of quantification and limitations to the awards of damages would 
be essential for the efficacy of a system of collective redress in areas of competence 
such as social policy; and it would have to require Member States to provide access 
to documents and evidence regarding consultations and discussion109 culminating in 
the transposition of a directive – subject to a balancing of the rights and legitimate 
interests of the State and the claimants (possibly exercised by the Court of 
Justice).110 Despite the discovery rules in England and Wales which are broad, 
especially when compared to the requirements established by the Commission in 
relation to anti-competition enforcement, it may also necessitate the adoption of an 
exception to the general rules on burden of proof by adopting legal presumption. 
This situation would benefit the claimants who may not have access to materials and 
evidence111 through which to substantiate a prima facie assertion – although the 
presumption is defeated through (even weak) evidence. Finally, collective redress 
would be governed through the application of strict procedural rules to ensure control 
of the activities of claimants and their representatives.112 
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 In relation to those rules necessary to substantiate claims, it is likely that rules 
similar to those established for anti-competition law,113 based as they are on a 
breach of statutory duty, would be followed. This has been particularly successful in 
areas such as enforcement and obtaining damages in workplace health and 
safety.114 Having breached the statutory duty (due to non- or (sufficiently serious) 
incorrect transposition) which has caused the claimants damage/loss (through denial 
of protective employment rights for example), the first two tests are satisfied. The 
remaining tests require the claimant to establish that the legislator intended to create 
a private right of action and fourthly, that the statute sought to protect the victim 
against the damage suffered. 
 Despite the objection of using breach of statutory duty to facilitate the award 
of a civil remedy for a failing on the part of a legislator, which may for example cause 
‘an undesirable potential for conflict between governmental discretion and the private 
right of enforcement’,115 a Member State has the capacity to safeguard its position 
and limit exposure to unreasonable and unsustainable damages actions by multiple 
claimants. It may choose to explicitly avoid the award of damages (unless 
unequivocally provided for in the relevant EU parent law) by placing into the 
transposing legislation, and making available, a system of compensation or other 
remedies which are ‘no less accessible’. This would thus avoid the requirement for 
State Liability claims from the outset by making an alternative form of remedy 
available to all (multiple) claimants. Protection in this area has also been provided to 
Member States where, for example, broad discretion as to the requirements of 
transposition of EU law is present.116 In Dillenkofer v Federal Republic of 
Germany,117 as there was little doubt what the directive required, the fact that 
Germany failed in its transposition duties resulted in a finding of liability on the part of 
the State due to the lack of discretion. Further, where the State has made a genuine, 
albeit mistaken attempt at transposition, liability will not be established unless the 
misunderstanding was cynical or egregious.118 
 A successful claim of breach of statutory duty requires satisfaction of the test 
that the relevant statute intended to protect victims against the kind of damage 
suffered. Claimants seeking redress under laws established through the EU’s social 
policy competence, for example, are likely to be well placed to demonstrate they fall 
under the specific class of persons to whom legislation sought to protect. Further, 
establishing that claimants possessed the standing for the purposes of satisfying the 
requirement of being in a class who are protected from the kind of damage suffered 
is not subject to a maximum, hence multiple claimants seeking collective redress in 
one legal action would not be a bar to a claim,119 insofar as they are an ascertainable 
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class. The final issue, and most problematic, is of the specific head of damages. This 
will likely prove to be the most significant issue for collective redress through breach 
of statutory duty. Awards of damages as compensation for physical injury are not 
uncommon, whereas awards for economic losses have generally been much more 
restrictive,120 and will likely be the only remedy sought for the State’s Liability in 
transposing EU law. Foreseeability and remoteness have effectively limited the 
extension of economic losses as being recoverable in isolation of physical loss 
(which is deemed foreseeable) for many reasons, the floodgates argument being 
central to limiting the number of claimants and the defendant’s exposure to risk 
(which would be significant in cases involving social policy laws and workers) and 
that economic loss involves an unreasonable level of speculation. To remove any 
uncertainty, and the associated ‘speculative’ dimension to economic loss, legislative 
action would remove doubt and establish clear rules regarding its application 
throughout the Member States. Crehan121 established the English courts approach to 
bending the rules regarding the requirement of foreseeability to facilitate a successful 
claim for economic loss. Similarly, the Commission could also legislate to enable 
discretion for national courts to find recovery for economic loss and to enable their 
calculation of any subsequent awards to be based on factual circumstances. 
 As has been demonstrated in this article, there are several examples of the 
limited effectiveness of State Liability in its current form. This is despite the judicial 
activism of the Court of Justice. The Commission, by assessing the impact of the 
Recommendation, and in subsequently developing the expected directive on 
collective redress for breaches of competition law, has demonstrated a willingness to 
legislate. This is despite the potential constitutional problems this may present. More 
broadly than the UK, there are potential problems for some Member States122 in the 
nature of a general system of collective redress which binds individuals to a legal 
action and subsequent judgment to which they did not take part, make any outward 
step in which to be involved, and in which the individual did not have the possibility to 
intervene. The opt-out model is certainly a welcome movement by the UK and would 
be a necessity when introducing collective redress for State Liability. The traditional 
inter partes method of litigation needs to be reassessed when considering an 
effective means of holding the State to account for breaches of EU law and whilst 
constitutional rights may be impinged, and associated complexity would be 
introduced through opt-out claims, the benefits for individuals, largely denied any 
meaningful access to State Liability and reliant as they currently are on action 
through the Commission to hold a Member State to account, outweigh these 
potential problems. This point is not made flippantly, but a new paradigm for effective 
rights management and enforcement is required if the new legal order of the EU,123 
first enshrined in 1963, is to be effected across the Member States. 
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 With the Commission’s Recommendation, and the subsequent UK response 
through the Consumer Rights Act 2015, it appears a definite move towards collective 
protection and enabling greater access to justice is taking place. The UK has gone 
further than necessary to hold wrong-doers in the field of competition law to account 
and facilitate a class of affected individuals’ access to their rights. It can only be 
hoped that in applying these strict standards of behaviour to such entities operating 
in the UK, and establishing an ease of access to available enforcement mechanisms, 
the government is equally willing to accede to future calls for collective redress in 
State Liability, potentially against itself. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article has sought to identify a path to justice for individuals affected by a breach 
of EU obligations of a Member State. To facilitate State Liability’s use and evolution 
from a damages-only action through tortious liability, to becoming a viable 
enforcement mechanism, the need for a system of collective redress to be made 
available is crucial. Using the collective redress model established in the 
Commission’s Recommendation in 2011 as the basis for extending the argument 
that political will may be present from the actions of the Commission and the 
Member States to facilitate access to justice through collective redress, it has been 
argued that extending this principle to State Liability as a genus, but on a sectoral 
basis, would provide both benefits of redress and access, whilst fulfilling the EU’s 
requirement that Member States adhere to their obligations. There are no legal or 
political bars to prevent the extension of collective redress to State Liability, the fears 
that collective redress will lead to the establishing of a litigation culture and abusive 
legal system across the EU are ill-founded, and Member States appear to be 
amenable to the concept and exercise of collective redress as a system of facilitating 
private enforcement of EU law.   
 Individuals who are denied rights granted through the membership of the EU 
must have an appropriately accessible and transparent system of redress available. 
Many individuals lack the social and economic power to secure their EU rights, and 
were this not the case, the system of EU law reporting and education, in the UK at 
least, makes awareness of laws and existing sources of help limited, disjointed and 
prohibitory. Individuals are also affected in their daily lives by EU rights (perhaps 
most visible to them through social policy initiatives) which, when denied through 
inadequate action on behalf of the State, profoundly and adversely affect their lives, 
but may be difficult to quantify financially. This makes the system of redress through 
State Liability as a mere damages action restrictive, largely inappropriate, but 
presently necessary. The consequential deterrence effect of many, albeit individually 
financially insignificant joined cases, may be witnessed when awards are provided to 
a class of claimants such as workers. The collective effect of such damages 
payments may serve as the necessary incentive for a State to correctly, and on-time, 
transpose EU directives.  
 The cost/benefit ratio of the necessary changes to the Member States’ legal 
systems requires close examination, but it appears, prima facie, to be worth the 
resource investment by the Commission to remedy the current limited effectiveness 
of State Liability. Data is needed as relatively little research has been conducted that 
conclusively substantiates the economic benefit for the introduction of collective 
 24 
actions in State Liability.124 However, the advantages of making EU rights 
accessible, creating a transparent system of redress and limiting the opportunities for 
a wrong-doing State from benefiting therefrom, certainly provides substantial 
advantages in ensuring EU law is followed and made available to those who are 
often the most vulnerable in society.  
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